In May 2021, the Legislative Council of Hong Kong passed a law stipulating that all incumbent district councilors must take an oath to pledge allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, as well as to uphold the Hong Kong Basic Law. About half of the district councilors in the opposition camp, most of them anti-China and anti-government radicals, believed that they were bound to lose their positions. They opted to resign before taking an oath in order to avoid being disqualified by the SAR government and, hopefully, to avoid having to return to the government the salaries and allowances they have been paid since assuming office. It is anticipated that eventually, almost all opposition district councilors, who make up the vast majority in all the district councils since the 2019 elections, will leave either voluntarily or involuntarily.
With the departure of most district councilors, the operation of the district councils will inevitably be affected. However, as the district councils are only local advisory bodies and their advice is not always sought after or respected by the government, their failure to function properly will have limited impact on the governance of Hong Kong. The government can continue to do its job at the local level, and other residential organizations will provide the necessary assistance.
Despite the departure of most district councilors, it is unlikely that by-elections will be held to fill the vacant seats. Given the existent electoral arrangements and the undercurrent of discontent among a substantial proportion of Hong Kong residents, the outcome of the by-elections is likely to be the continued control of the district councils by the radical opposition. Instead, I expect the government to seriously consider the future of the district councils in Hong Kong’s political system in view of the necessity to realize the principles of “patriots governing Hong Kong” and “banishing people who are anti-China and who undermine Hong Kong’s stability from the governance system of Hong Kong”.
Article 97 of the Basic Law stipulates that “District organizations which are not organs of political power may be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to be consulted by the government of the Region on district administration and other affairs, or to be responsible for providing services in such fields as culture, recreation and environmental sanitation.” Article 98 stipulates that “the powers and functions of the district organizations and the method for their formation shall be prescribed by law.” Accordingly, the current district councils have no constitutional status under the Basic Law; the government therefore has the power to dismantle them and replace them with other local bodies. In fact, right after Hong Kong’s return to China, the Urban Council and the Regional Council, which had more statutory powers and resources than the district councils, were abolished because they no longer served the administrative needs of the government.
In the future, will the district councils be maintained? Will their number be reduced or increased? Will their role and functions be changed? Will they be replaced by other local advisory bodies? What will be the role and functions of their replacements? What will be the composition and method of formation of the new district councils or their replacements? Will appointed members be added to the district councils or their replacements? Answers to all these questions are not clear now.
It is certain that the district councils as we know them will not and cannot continue. It is highly unlikely that their role and functions will be enhanced. It is quite likely that appointed members will be added to the revamped district councils or their replacements. If there are elections to the district councils or their replacements, the candidates will be stringently vetted to make sure that they are patriots.
he role and functions of local advisory bodies will be strictly restricted to conform to the stipulations of the Basic Law
Most importantly, the role and functions of local advisory bodies will be strictly restricted to conform to the stipulations of the Basic Law. Historically, the district councils were set up by the departing colonial government in 1982 ostensibly as bodies representing the needs and interests of residents, bringing the government closer to the people. In reality, as confirmed to me by a late colonial secretary, they were expected to be political bodies providing public opinion support to the British during their negotiations with China over the future of Hong Kong after 1997. The departing colonial government gave the district councils very broad and vague terms of reference, allowing and encouraging the district councilors to raise and discuss political issues and collaborate with the British with the aim of pressuring China into making concessions to Britain. These broad and vague terms of reference have not been restricted drastically since Hong Kong’s return to China so as to confine the work of the district councils to local issues bearing upon the livelihoods and well-being of residents. Before 2019, the district councils were dominated by either pro-government or moderate opposition councilors. Even though there were instances of political strife, they remained local bodies focusing mainly on non-political issues.
Unfortunately, the situation fundamentally changed after the 2019 District Council Election. Buoyed by anti-China and anti-government fervor, the electorate awarded most seats to the anti-China and anti-government radicals. The radicals have used their newfound “powers” to turn the district councils into political platforms to struggle against Beijing and the SAR government, to advocate the independence of Hong Kong, and to humiliate the government officials attending their meetings. After the forced departure of the opposition figures from the Legislative Council following the National Security Law for Hong Kong and other measures from Beijing, the district councils have become even more important to the opposition as they struggle to survive in an increasingly inhospitable environment brought about by the security law and an electoral system revamped to ensure “patriots governing Hong Kong”. The newly established oath-taking system has denied even this remnant political stronghold to the opposition.
The wholesale banishment of the radical opposition from the district councils will have significant repercussions for Hong Kong politics. The political opposition, particularly its more radical elements, will by and large be excluded from Hong Kong’s governance structure for a long time
The wholesale banishment of the radical opposition from the district councils will have significant repercussions for Hong Kong politics. The political opposition, particularly its more radical elements, will by and large be excluded from Hong Kong’s governance structure for a long time. Opposition politicians can no longer obtain financial and other support from the local advisory bodies. They can no longer use the local advisory bodies as steppingstones to the legislature, to sustain or grow their political organizations, to build their social support base or to groom their successors. As only 20 seats are allotted to direct elections out of a total 90 seats in the revamped Legislative Council, local constituency work and hence work in the local advisory bodies will become less important in building one’s political career. This makes it even more difficult for the political opposition to recruit new blood to participate in the elections to local advisory bodies, if there are such elections. It is indubitably true that the patriots who focus on the local advisory bodies and the directly elected seats to the Legislative Council are also adversely affected by the new composition of the legislature, but since an overwhelming proportion of the seats in the legislature and the local advisory bodies will be held by patriots, the overall impact of the revamping of the local advisory bodies and the legislature on the patriotic camp is minimal.
The future of the district councils is uncertain. Nonetheless, it is quite certain that whatever the future is of the district councils or their replacements, the political opposition of Hong Kong will be devastated. Unless they undergo a transmogrification and become patriots, their political future is bleak indeed. In any case, Hong Kong’s stability and governance will no longer be threatened by a political opposition which rejects the post-1997 constitutional order of Hong Kong.
The author is emeritus professor of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.