Lau Siu-kai, vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies. (PHOTO / CHINADAILY.COM.CN)
Veteran political analyst Professor Lau Siu-kai is on the show this week. Lau says China does not want the Taiwan question to give the US a way to exert its political and military might in the region in the longer term. He says the current political situation is partly due to the upcoming election in the US.
Check out the full transcript of TVB’s Straight Talk host Dr. Eugene Chan’s interview with Professor Lau Siu-kai
Chan: Good evening, you’re watching Straight Talk with Eugene Chan. Our guest tonight is Professor Lau Siu-kai, who is emeritus professor of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies. Professor Lau has served our Hong Kong SAR government in various capacities over the last 30 years, including being head of the Central Policy Unit. He has also been a member of the CPPCC since 2003. Professor Lau is an active commentator on social and political development in Hong Kong with many publications in this area. We have invited Professor Lau to tell us if cross-Straits hostility is on the rise. Welcome, professor.
Lau: Hello, Eugene.
Chan: Professor, in the last three weeks, many things have happened. We had Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, ending up… despite numerous warnings from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Our motherland has launched the largest-ever military exercise surrounding Taiwan, and also issued a white paper. On the other side, the US has unveiled the “Taiwan Policy Act”, and has also started negotiations with Taiwan on a bilateral trade agreement. We’d like to ask you basing on that a few areas for your expertise, and one is about military exercises. It has been shown that the People’s Liberation Army has the full power to do so-called a full blockade of Taiwan. So is this the only signal that PLA is sending through?
Lau: Well, I think China is very determined this time to resolve the Taiwan question once and for all. The military exercises only mean that China is launching a whole series of actions to force Taiwan into a political negotiation with the mainland over the details of “one country, two systems”, which is the formula employed by the central government to reunify the country. So we are going to see more and more actions, military, trade, diplomatic, etc, to be applied on Taiwan by the mainland, to make sure that Taiwan will be subject to increasing pressure. And also to show that, under these pressures, Taiwan cannot be able to get too much help from the United States, with lots of mainland's initiative, to change completely the Taiwan situation.
Chan: Right, Professor Lau, one of the terms that often be mentioned in the news is “the median line”. What is the median line, and what is its significance of it being crossed right now?
Lau: The median line is basically an informal line in the Taiwan Straits, originally set by the Americans in 1996. And for a long time, both sides of the Taiwan Straits were willing to observe this line. But by crossing this line this time, what Beijing is trying to show, look particularly to show the Taiwan residents and the United States, that Taiwan is now under the overall jurisdiction of China. That means China sees Taiwan as part of its own, so that China can no longer have to observe the so-called median line, as well as the so-called Air Defense Identification Zone set by the Taiwan authorities. So what we’re seeing now is that China is treating Taiwan as basically an internal affair within China, and China is all going to take all actions available to make sure that this Taiwan question can be resolved within a reasonable period of time. As the best scenario is peaceful reunification, but China will never give up and might eventually resort to nonpeaceful reunification to make sure that China will reunify to great power.
Chan: Right. Professor Lau, well, some say that the US is trying to push China into initiating a conflict based on the fact that with the Pelosi visit, there was much talked about them, I mean it’s better for her not to go, but obviously (US President Joe) Biden didn’t stop it because according to The Washington Post, Pelosi said, if President Biden asked her not to go, she won’t go, or (if) Tsai Ing-wen withdrew the invitation. So obviously, Biden is fully aware of the consequences of inaction. And moreover, since last week, last week we had a delegation of five representatives from the US Congress go to Taiwan. And right at this moment, we had the first time the Indiana governor actually visited Taiwan with a delegation. Suddenly, this was a very high-profile visit to Taiwan. So do you think this is a planned plot, or this is just happened by coincidence, as they said it was planned some time ago?
Lau: Well, not necessarily, under the current political atmosphere in the United States, but clearly in view of the by-elections, in the coming months, and all the politicians in the United States want to show the people in their country that they are hawkish in their policy toward China. And given the fact that they’re essentially blaming their government, cannot control the behavior of the legislators and other people in the states. So they are competing for control.
Chan: Spotlight, yes.
Lau: They are willing to play a hard line against Beijing. But even Beijing will be very careful to choose the kind of reaction it is going to take. Pelosi is the third-most important politician under the American system. That’s why China has to demonstrate its hostility, or its anger toward the American provocation. But for the other congressmen or other governors, etc, Beijing will simply launch some protest, maybe or also some military exercises, to show Beijing’s displeasure. But in any case, at the present moment, I think Beijing has already made up its mind that in the eyes of the United States, a divided China, a permanently divided China is to the best interest of the United States. That’s why China is in a hurry to resolve the Taiwan question because Taiwan is no longer only an issue of unification, but also the issue of national security. Because Beijing is seeing Taiwan being used increasingly by the United States as part of the so-called, Indo-Pacific strategy to contain and weaken China. And if this trend is not stopped, Taiwan not only will not be reunified with the country, but will become a threat to national security. That’s why China is so determined this time to resolve this Taiwan question once and for all.
Chan: Professor, while you mentioned the term “national security” where many Hong Kong viewers will feel that threat is imminent. But if you look at the third Straits crisis in 1996 and 1997, where the US Navy did send their warships into the area compared with this time, actually, the warship actually left with Pelosi. So there’s something to note. And also we talked about the “Taiwan Policy Act”, which hasn’t been enacted, it will be delayed (and currently is being discussed in the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee). It actually says they recognize Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally, and provides almost $4.5 billion over the four years to bolster the defense capacities. So what do you say to that if it does pass?
Lau: Well, I think China has now seized the initiative on the Taiwan question. And China is looking very closely at what the United States is going to do in the days ahead. And this time, it’s different from 1996 and 1997 because compared with 1996, China is much more powerful today. And by showing these exercises, I think a lot of American strategists have been impressed by the military exercises around Taiwan. China wants to show the United States, if the United States continues to obstruct China’s reunification, it has to pay a very heavy price, and China has shown that it has the capability to take on the United States by denying its entry into the theater of Taiwan.
Chan: Professor Lau, we had Mr David Lie here two weeks ago, and he said that the issue between Taiwan and the motherland is actually an internal affair, which you have also mentioned. So, obviously the reason why the US is interfering is for her own interests. But isn’t that the change from the “one-China policy” (the US) professes that is still … will they still respect that? Is that against that?
Lau: From my own point of view, the one-China policy in the United States is no longer there. Particularly when the United States seem to downgrade the importance of the “Three Communiques” between United States and China and puts priority on the domestic laws of the United States, such as the “Taiwan Relations Act”, as well as the so-called Six Assurances to Taiwan. Well, what the United States is doing now is to increasingly recognize Taiwan as an independent political entity and try to develop closer diplomatic and military relationships between the United States and Taiwan. Sell there all of their arms, ammunition to Taiwan. So from China’s point of view, China has given up hope already, that the United States will look with acronymity, reunification between Taiwan and the mainland.
Chan: Professor, now, before we go to the break, I want to ask you about the white paper that was published on August 10. It said, the title, “Taiwan Issue and China’s Reunification in the New Era”, saying that the base of “one country, two systems”, they’re basing on peaceful reunification. But at this moment, it looks like we’re not going along that direction. So the question of the show today, “Has cross-Straits hostility risen to a point that we have to be concerned about it?”
Lau: Well, I think what the result will be depends very much on the reaction of the United States, because China has demonstrated its position. And that it will resort to force if necessary to reunify the country. So China will watch very closely, what will be the reaction of the United States in the days ahead. Particularly, as I can see, what will be the “Taiwan Policy Act” fare … how will that Policy Act fare in the days ahead, because as you said, this “Taiwan Policy Act” will become even more provocative.
Chan: Yes.
Lau: They are all the actions the United States has taken in the past, because it treats Taiwan as basically a military ally against China, particularly when China is now concerned about whether the US is going to construct a so-called Asian NATO to contain China’s rise.
Chan: We’ve been talking with Professor Lau about the recent developments in the cross-Straits crisis. So, professor, before the break, we have mentioned about whether hostility is on the rise, and there is also a white paper issued by our motherland. One question is that the Taiwan “foreign ministry” spokeswoman has said that they have rejected the ‘one country two systems’ that we proposed so that we have a peaceful reunification. So with the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan still in power or any of her successors, is it going to make this reunification in a peaceful way basically an impossible way forward?
Lau: Well, basically I am not surprised by the fact that Taiwan would reject the “one country, two systems” principle. But we also know that this “one country, two systems” principle means this “one country” means the People’s Republic of China. It has been made quite explicit by the mainland. So I’m not surprised by that Taiwan will reject “one country, two systems”. But the problem is that if the pressure on Taiwan increases in the days ahead, if even some kind of blockade on Taiwan by the PLA is going to take place, the pressure in Taiwan might increase to such an extent that there may be an outflow of capital and talents from Taiwan, as well as internal division among the Taiwan residents. Then Beijing will look further ahead to see whether those forces in Taiwan that are favorable to reunification will rise and create an atmosphere or environment for the two sides of the Straits to talk about the country’s reunification. So we have to look at what is going to happen in Taiwan in the years ahead. At the same time, both sides of the Straits will also look very closely on whether the United States are determined to defend Taiwan militarily if the so-called “invasion” from the mainland takes place. But from my own point of view, I don’t think the United States will reach a war with China, pretty much go like Korea, in order to prevent Taiwan from returning to the motherland. So a lot of things can happen, but in the meantime, I think the cross-Straits tension and the tension between China and the United States will increase tremendously in the days ahead.
Chan: Right. Professor Lau, since we talked so much from the global perspective, say from the Hong Kong side, a lot of Hong Kong people will have said, I’m sure the viewers will agree with me, saying that the “one country, two systems” that we practiced will be a model for Taiwan people to look at, how it can work. But now after the last three years, we had the national security legislation, as well as “patriots administrating Hong Kong” principle. Is this going to help the Taiwan residents have more confidence in the “one country, two systems”? I mean the Taiwan version to come, what do you think?
Lau: Not necessarily in the meantime because the Taiwan residents, as well as a lot of Hong Kong people, have an inaccurate idea of what “one country, two systems” is all about. They see Hong Kong as an independent political entity, denying Beijing the power under “one country, two systems”. From Beijing’s point of view, “one country, two systems” has not been practiced comprehensively accurately for many years. So what happened in the last several years is that the Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” begins to operate according to the original design of Beijing, particularly the design of Deng Xiaoping. So in the years ahead, we have to do two things. One is to demonstrate to the Taiwan residents that they have mistaken “one country, two systems” for what (it was) in the past. And now they have to observe what will be the result if “one country, two systems” is operating comprehensively accurately. Secondly, I think from Hong Kong’s point of view, if we can, in the new circumstances, develop Hong Kong properly ensuring prosperity and stability, and show the Taiwan residents that when “one country, two systems” is practiced correctly, then a lot of benefits can come to Hong Kong. And by inference, if Taiwan adopts “one country, two systems”, the formula, Taiwan can also enjoy prosperity and stability, as well as a high degree of autonomy. So I would say that in the days ahead, we have to correct the misunderstanding of Taiwan residents as to what “one country, two systems” is all about in Hong Kong, and to show that Hong Kong can still prosper and develop, and maintain stability under “one country, two systems” when it is correctly practiced.
Chan: Right. Professor Lau, one thing that I am sure the viewers have noticed and sent me a message to ask you, is that unlike before, the Hong Kong government officials actually were quite quiet in response to all these national matters involved in the international arena. But this time we see the chief executive, the chief secretary for administration, everybody along the line have all issued separate statements condemning the Pelosi visit. Is this a new role that Hong Kong is going to play? Are we going to be one of the front guards for the mainland?
Lau: Well, I think for those essential issues facing the country, particularly those political issues, Hong Kong and the Hong Kong officials have the duty to stay in line with Beijing, and to show that we have some kind of solidarity when some important issues are facing the United States. But on the other hand, I would say that in the days ahead, Hong Kong will meet with a lot of hostility and antagonism from the West. I don’t expect the relationship between Hong Kong and the West will improve tremendously. But at the same time, I think Hong Kong can still work together with the country to develop or to forge better relationships with developing countries to help China overall diplomatically.
Chan: Professor, you just mentioned basically the Taiwan Straits regions are going to be very high-risk areas, and Hong Kong seems to be in the front line. So do we have a real risk of national security if anything happens to Taiwan? Do you think Hong Kong will be affected directly rather than just indirectly affected by the blockade, for example?
Lau: If tension continues to rise between the mainland and Taiwan, Hong Kong must be affected. And you can see the last several years, Taiwan has been heavily involved in Hong Kong’s riots or insurrection, a lot of Taiwan independences have operated in Hong Kong to promote Hong Kong instability. So in the days ahead, even though Hong Kong does not have official, we don’t have autonomy in terms of official relationship with Taiwan, we have to follow the lead of Beijing. But in any case, I expect the relationship between Taiwan and Hong Kong to deteriorate further because officially, we have to follow the line of Beijing to sanction the Taiwan people, particularly the officials and those people advocating independence. But hopefully, we can still maintain our economic and social exchanges with Taiwan. Even so, if Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan continues to increase, and if Beijing insists or demands that Hong Kong follow suit in some areas, in terms of social and cultural and economic exchanges, then our relationship with Taiwan might deteriorate further. But in any case, the relationship between Taiwan and Hong Kong, in an official sense, it’s already very bad. The official linkages are basically untenable these days.
Chan: All right. Professor, the last-minute question I want to ask you in the last one minute is that the word “semiconductor” has been in the spotlight in the news. And with Nancy (Pelosi) visiting Taiwan trade, and they have the CHIPS and Science Act passing in the US to provide subsidies of $52 billion to support the semiconductor development in the US, provided that they don’t do businesses with China. So this going to put a lot of pressure onto the businesses, so how shall China respond to that?
Lau: The only thing China can respond to that is to develop its own semiconductor industry because eventually I would expect the US to reduce its dependence on Taiwan for semiconductors; that’s why Taiwan semiconductors are forced to relocate to the US. But that is not good news for Taiwan because if the semiconductor industry is away from Taiwan, that means that Taiwan’s value to the United States will even become lower and lower.
Chan: Right. So thank you, Professor Lau, for enlightening us on the latest developments of the cross-Straits crisis. I’m sure all of our viewers and the rest of the world will be watching this event very closely. Have a good week, stay healthy, and good night.