Back in the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, the “chief architect” of the “one country, two systems” (OCTS) policy, made it crystal clear that “patriots governing Hong Kong” (PGHK) was not only a key principle of OCTS but also critical to its successful implementation. About 40 years later, at a meeting with Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, on Jan 27, 2021, President Xi Jinping reiterated, with a strong sense of urgency, the significance of PGHK.
President Xi emphasized specifically the relevance of PGHK to the long-term success of “OCTS”, as it is pertinent to national sovereignty, security, development interests, and the HKSAR’s long-term prosperity and stability. Only with PGHK in place could Beijing’s comprehensive jurisdiction over Hong Kong be fulfilled, the constitutional order of Hong Kong safeguarded, the deep-seated contradictions in Hong Kong resolved, good governance and long-term stability in Hong Kong realized, and Hong Kong able to make the proper contribution to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
Notwithstanding the indispensability of PGHK, the harsh reality is that since Hong Kong’s return to the motherland in 1997, and until recently, the principle of PGHK was not yet established in the HKSAR. Mr Xia Baolong, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Office of the State Council, candidly admitted that at a seminar held on Feb 22 this year. Mr Xia lamented that a major reason why the anti-China and anti-Hong Kong government elements could stir up so much trouble in Hong Kong since 1997 was that PGHK had not been completely attained.
In March 2021, Beijing sanctioned a drastic revamp in the electoral system of Hong Kong, barring all “non-patriots” from running in elections for the Election Committee, the Legislative Council and the chief executive. Theoretically speaking, since then Hong Kong has entered a stage in which its governance is completely dominated by the patriots. Nevertheless, in terms of actually exercising strong and effective governance, PGHK still has a long way to go. Today, despite a facade of unity, the patriotic camp is still plagued by a plethora of problems that have weakened its capacity and credibility as a governing force. From a historical perspective, the patriotic camp had been harassed and discriminated against in the past by the colonial government and a community infused with anti-communist sentiments. Even though the patriotic camp has expanded quite a bit since 1997, the role of patriots in Hong Kong’s governance was still quite limited, as Beijing, out of pragmatism and lacking alternatives, had perforce to rely on the old-establishment elites inherited from the colonial era to run Hong Kong. The anti-communist and anti-China opposition continued to run amok in the HKSAR and could outcompete the patriots in the arenas of public opinion and district-level elections. The anti-communist sentiment in Hong Kong, though having subsided to a certain extent, remained a serious constraint on the development of the patriotic camp.
The enactment of the National Security Law for Hong Kong and the revamping of Hong Kong’s electoral system in the past couple of years undeniably do provide a favorable context for the enlargement and strengthening of the patriotic camp. Nonetheless, it has to be conceded that PGHK is still a work in progress and will not be finished within the next decade, to put it mildly. However, this does not prevent external and internal critics, mostly with ulterior motives, from jumping to the conclusion that PGHK has failed, pointing to “evidence” such as the fumbling efforts of the HKSAR government to control the fifth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and the acrimonious bickering within the patriotic camp. While these criticisms are unfair and premature, they however do point to the imperative need for Beijing to speed up the development of the patriotic camp through top-level planning, heavy devotion of resources, and concerted efforts with the HKSAR government and the patriotic community leaders. The core elements of this strategic task are the systematic grooming, deployment, and organization of the patriotic political elites.
In the first place, external forces must be denied opportunities to hamper efforts to develop the patriotic camp. Admittedly, external forces, particularly Western politicians and organizations, have found their space of political maneuvering in Hong Kong severely constricted. Nevertheless, they can still use a variety of means to dissuade or discourage patriotic elites from joining the patriotic camp or compelling them to leave or betray it by threatening them and their families with sanctions, penalties or denial of services, particularly those in the financial sector. Western media and online outlets could be used extensively to vilify and malign them. To counter the sinister efforts of the external forces, Beijing and the HKSAR government have to devise the necessary laws and mechanisms to protect the elites against threats and to provide them with the necessary support and assistance.
Second, a comprehensive set of long-term strategies for the development of patriotic political elites has to be meticulously made at the top and executed on the ground. These strategies should include the identification, encouragement, classification, grooming, assessment, supervision, appointment, dismissal, deployment, disciplining and accountability of patriotic political elites. Since the international situation is becoming more complicated and grimmer, the vision, wisdom, boldness, dedication, stamina and resilience of the patriotic political elites are the essential qualities. Of particular importance are the elites’ loyalty to the nation and Hong Kong as well as their will and ability to battle with external forces.
Third, central government officials, particularly those stationed in Hong Kong, together with senior officials of the HKSAR government and leaders of the patriotic camp, should maximally use their contact with a wide spectrum of elites to recruit people with political ability and aspirations to join the patriotic camp. People with name recognition and who are active in the media and the public arenas “normally” have good potential to become patriotic political elites. Capable members of the political opposition should also be encouraged to turn into patriots if they are willing to jettison their previous political stances and work together with Beijing and the patriots. Moreover, people who make self-recommendations should also be carefully considered as potential recruits.
Fourth, prospective patriotic political elites should be appointed to different political offices under the control of Beijing and the HKSAR government by their abilities and dispositions. Their performance on the job should be rigorously examined and assessed. These political offices can be arranged to form various ladders of success so that some sort of upward mobility path can be charted and made explicit to people who want to pursue a political career.
Fifth, a “revolving door” has to be built between the political offices controlled by Beijing and the HKSAR government. For example, a competent Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress can be appointed as a principal official of the HKSAR government and vice versa. Political elites with experience in the governance of the nation and Hong Kong are more likely to have a broad national perspective as well as practical experience in the administration of Hong Kong.
Sixth, since many patriotic political elites have no intention to pursue a lifelong political career, they should be allowed and enabled to return to the private sector after brief stints in the government. A “revolving door” between private-sector positions and political positions is therefore highly desirable. Such a “revolving door” would also turn the private sector into a “reservoir” of political talent that can be tapped into as needed.
Seventh, think tanks inside the government and in society should be actively promoted and supported. Up to now, think tanks, particularly those with expertise in international affairs and strategic studies, are underdeveloped and in short supply. A career in think tanks is not only not attractive but also not available. In other places, think tanks are an important source of political talent. To build up Hong Kong’s think tanks, financial support from Beijing, the HKSAR government and the large corporations in the patriotic camp are crucial, and so is a close working relationship between think tanks and the government. For a think tank to be able to come up with feasible policy proposals, it has to be able to obtain the needed information, data and the results of policy implementation from the government, which however all along has been reluctant to share them with “outsiders”.
Eighth, the civil service is a major avenue to groom patriotic political elites with the necessary experience in administrative work. All along, the civil service is a relatively “closed”, insular and inbreeding organization, particularly its elite corps, the administrative grade. For the sake of developing patriotic political elites, the top- and senior-level positions of the civil service have to be open to outside talent whether as career or contract civil servants.
Ninth, patriots should be encouraged to take part in various elections to acquire political experience and forge political linkages with the Hong Kong people, especially those at the local and grassroots level. Patriotic political elites with a mass base are essential to broaden the social base of the patriotic camp and enhance its political legitimacy and capability.
Tenth, the local and grassroots networks in Hong Kong have become a bit defunct since 1997 as they have been largely deserted by the HKSAR government. Renewed efforts have to be dedicated and sustained by Beijing, the HKSAR government, and the patriotic camp to rebuild and revitalize these networks so that they can again be the breeding ground for patriotic political talent.
Lastly, it is most important that the patriotic political elites be tightly organized and effectively led by Beijing, in concertation with the HKSAR government and the leaders of the patriotic camp. Only with a disciplined political coalition of these elites can the patriotic camp become a powerful and effective governing force to successfully realize PGHK and implement OCTS.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.